The Cold War between the vanquished Soviet Union and the United States was simple and straightforward. Military power was balanced by mutually assured destruction. The two sides argued, feared and created myths about each other.
The world survived the showdownbecause we depended upon both Russia and America acting rational. We feared accidents or miscommunication, but believed that survival would leave both sides to fight another day.
Competition was relegated to military, ideology and symbolism. There were only two competitors, with other nations in supporting roles.
A form of Cold War continues today. Angry rhetoric, provocative acts and the questioning of deed and intent shape the discussion. The participants do not trust each other. Political shae ups in Britain, France and Germany, with imminent change in Russia and the U.S., not to mention the addition of China and India as world powers, complicates the dialogue.
But this new cold war is different. The U.S. proposes missile bases, which have more symbolic than military value. America holds onto the Jackson-Vanik legislation, and delays approval for Russia's membership in the World Trade Organization. New European leaders are replacing those who sought closer ties with Russia.
Actions against new members of the EU - such as the Russian ban on meat from Poland, trade blockades, possible cyber attacks against Estonia, and the stoppage of Russian oil supplies to a Lithuania - become issues involving Europe and the U.S.
Meanwhile, former members of the Soviet Union, such as Georgia and the Ukraine, are in line for membership in Western clubs.
Europe remains dependent. Ironically, their dependency upon U.S. military protection against the Soviet Union has been replaced by an increasing dependence upon the energy resources of their former enemy.
With the growth of the European Union, the Euro, the strength of the German economy, European companies, and the London financial markets, Europe defines itself as a force to be respected. This new self-definition has become the European mental filter for action.
Europe does not want to be dependent, but understands their economic future is based upon Russian supplies. Germany now imports 40 percent of its gas and 30 percent of their oil from Russia, which will increase to 60 percent of gas by 2025.
In reality, however, Russia needs European markets as much as Europe needs Russian oil and gas, but Russia has been able to shape the discussion.
What bothers Europe most is the realization that no perfect short-term alternatives exist; they lack the political will for developing joint energy policies or defense systems.
For the U.S., the new Cold War finds them less capable of leadership than in the past. Americans are perceived as isolated and a power that is in the early stages of decline. The limits of American military have been exposed in Iraq and Afganistan.
It was always better to be perceived as invincible, without having to act, than to act, and be shown as lacking the ability to achieve your goals. The U.S. faces new and growing dependencies upon imported oil, increased debt, foreign trade deficits, but mostly a lack of political will to maintain their status as sole world superpower.
What has not changed is the American lack of ability to anticipate the actions of others. For many years, this reflected an American belief that other nations reacted to U.S. policies, not shaped them.
U.S. policy makers appeared truly surprised by Putin's February Munich speech, followed by his May 9th implied comparison of the U.S. to the Third Reich. Americans had become used to this rhetoric from people like Hugo Chavez and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, but not the president of Russia.
The other major change is the role and self-identity of Russia as a global dynamic. Russia's growing assertiveness reflects a new confidence: the era of victimhood is over, and its role as a global leader can be achieved.
The feeling that Russia is neither Eastern nor Western, but unique, has once again taken root. A recent EU-Russia Center poll reveals that Russians now define themselves as distinct from Europe. Over half of those surveyed said they view the EU as a potential threat, while 71 percent said they did not regard themselves as Europeans.
What frightens the West is the ‘economic and resource nationalism' behind Russia's actions. In sync withthe world's growing dependency on Russian gas and oil, increasing Kremlin control of Central Asian reserves, changes in political rhetoric between the E.U, the U.S. and the Kremlin, have hampered the West's ability to control and predict Russian actions.
During the old Cold war, a realization was achieved that differences required a form of resolution. The new Cold war has not yet reached that level of understanding. With growing nationalism in Russia, changing leadership in the West, and the increasing level of vitriolic rhetoric, the likelihood of finding solutions becomes more difficult.
By Todd Lefko
